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This Coming Weekend:(The Hippocratic Oath Today) and the downfall of the Art od Medicine [in the United States]

The Hippocratic Oath Today

The oath: Meaningless Relic or Invaluable Moral Guide?

The Hippocratic Oath is one of the oldest binding documents in history. Written in antiquity, its principles are held sacred by doctors to this day: treat the sick to the best of one's ability, preserve patient privacy, teach the secrets of medicine to the next generation, and so on. "The Oath of Hippocrates," holds the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics (1996 edition), "has remained in Western civilization as an expression of ideal conduct for the physician." Today, most graduating medical-school students swear to some form of the oath, usually a modernized version. Indeed, oath-taking in recent decades has risen to near uniformity, with just 24 percent of U.S. medical schools administering the oath in 1928 to nearly 100 percent today.

Yet paradoxically, even as the modern oath's use has burgeoned, its content has tacked away from the classical oath's basic tenets. According to a 1993* survey of 150 U.S. and Canadian medical schools, for example, only 14 percent of modern oaths prohibit euthanasia, 11 percent hold convenant with a deity, 8 percent foreswear abortion, and a mere 3 percent forbid sexual contact with patients—all maxims held sacred in the classical version. The original calls for free tuition for medical students and for doctors never to "use the knife" (that is, conduct surgical procedures)—both obviously out of step with modern-day practice. Perhaps most telling, while the classical oath calls for "the opposite" of pleasure and fame for those who transgress the oath, fewer than half of oaths taken today insist the taker be held accountable for keeping the pledge.

Indeed, a growing number of physicians have come to feel that the Hippocratic Oath is inadequate to address the realities of a medical world that has witnessed huge scientific, economic, political, and social changes, a world of legalized abortion, physician-assisted suicide, and pestilences unheard of in Hippocrates' time. Some doctors have begun asking pointed questions regarding the oath's relevance: In an environment of increasing medical specialization, should physicians of such different stripes swear to a single oath? With governments and health-care organizations demanding patient information as never before, how can a doctor maintain a patient's privacy? Are physicians morally obligated to treat patients with such lethal new diseases as AIDS or the Ebola virus?

Other physicians are taking broader aim. Some claim that the principles enshrined in the oath never constituted a shared core of moral values, that the oath's pagan origins and moral cast make it antithetical to beliefs held by Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Others note that the classical Oath makes no mention of such contemporary issues as the ethics of experimentation, team care, or a doctor's societal or legal responsibilities. (Most modern oaths, in fact, are penalty-free, with no threat to potential transgressors of loss of practice or even of face.)
With all this in mind, some doctors see oath-taking as little more than a pro-forma ritual with little value beyond that of upholding tradition. "The original oath is redolent of a convenant, a solemn and binding treaty," writes Dr. David Graham in JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association (12/13/00). "By contrast, many modern oaths have a bland, generalized air of 'best wishes' about them, being near-meaningless formalities devoid of any influence on how medicine is truly practiced." Some physicians claim what they call the "Hypocritic Oath" should be radically modified or abandoned altogether.

Below, see classical and modern versions of the oath. At the bottom of the page, you'll find links to pages where you can read comments by [doctors] and [non-doctors] and add your own.

*Orr, R. D., N. Pang, E. D. Pellegrino, and M. Siegler. 1997. "Use of the Hippocratic Oath: A Review of Twentieth-Century Practice and a Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in Medical Schools in the U.S. and Canada in 1993." The Journal of Clinical Ethics 8 (Winter): 377-388.
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Hippocratic Oath: Classical Version

I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfill according to my ability and judgment this oath and this covenant:

To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my life in partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, and to regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach them this art—if they desire to learn it—without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons and to the sons of him who has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the covenant and have taken an oath according to the medical law, but no one else.
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.

I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody who asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.

I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in this work.

Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and in particular of sexual relations with both female and male persons, be they free or slaves.

What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about.

If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.

—Translation from the Greek by Ludwig Edelstein. From The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and Interpretation, by Ludwig Edelstein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943.
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Hippocratic Oath: Modern Version

I swear to fulfill, to the best of my ability and judgment, this covenant:

I will respect the hard-won scientific gains of those physicians in whose steps I walk, and gladly share such knowledge as is mine with those who are to follow.
I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required, avoiding those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism.

I will remember that there is art to medicine as well as science, and that warmth, sympathy, and understanding may outweigh the surgeon's knife or the chemist's drug.
I will not be ashamed to say "I know not," nor will I fail to call in my colleagues when the skills of another are needed for a patient's recovery.

I will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me that the world may know. Most especially must I tread with care in matters of life and death. If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty. Above all, I must not play at God.

I will remember that I do not treat a fever chart, a cancerous growth, but a sick human being, whose illness may affect the person's family and economic stability. My responsibility includes these related problems, if I am to care adequately for the sick.

I will prevent disease whenever I can, for prevention is preferable to cure.

I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as well as the infirm.

If I do not violate this oath, may I enjoy life and art, respected while I live and remembered with affection thereafter. May I always act so as to preserve the finest traditions of my calling and may I long experience the joy of healing those who seek my help.

—Written in 1964 by Louis Lasagna, Academic Dean of the School of Medicine at Tufts University, and used in many medical schools today.
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Let us also never forget the Most important Precept of all in the Art of Medical Practice: [Above ALL, do no harm].
Yet in today's US society which is based on the most extreme form of Capitalism and Economic Gain, most of what the original ideas of the Art of Medicine are sacrificed daily (and quite legally] for self-serving Financial wants of health Practitioners.

Coming this Weekend: The futility of the US Healthcare System, and the Hippocracy within

Coming this weekend on my Blog. All the lies, cheats, con games, drug dealing, and Hypocrisy that goes on behind close doors by those who take The Hippocratic Oath (i.e. medical professionals). As part of this analytical research which I have conducted for nearly five years (FOR AT MY BLOG, ONLY THE TRUTH IS GIVEN THROUGH THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC, LOGICAL, AND ARTISTIC METHODS)i WILL ALSO SHOW WHY IN THE UNITED STATES [THE WAY THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IS SET UP] THERE CAN NEVER BE A UNIVERSAL HEALTH SYSTEM. President Obama and all his colleagues (in the White House, at Congress, in the Supreme Court, and every where else in Washington) are fully aware of this fact. However, they insist on deceiving the public, in order to keep their game of smoke and mirrors going, so that they can all line their pockets. (These politicians are NOT FOR AMERICA, BUT RATHER FOR THEIR OWN SELF-CENTERED GREEDY AND GLUTTONESS SELVES).

Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium

See Folks, they (the government and the powers that are) have never motioned anything on the possibilities of Plutonium which is a natural by-product of a controlled and sustained atomic chain reaction in a nuclear power plant:
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By Revati Prasad and Jill Marie Parillo

Updated February 2006

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URANIUM ENRICHMENT

                

Development of an Iranian enrichment program started just after the 1974 oil crisis. The program nearly came to a halt following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, yet Iran continued small scale nuclear research, including centrifuge experiments in the 1980s. Iran has pursued two different methods for enriching uranium: gas centrifuge enrichment and laser enrichment.

In October of 2003 to avoid referral to the UN Security Council (UNSC) Iran suspended its enrichment program and allowed for IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol. Iran signed the protocol on December 18, 2003, though the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) never ratified it. However, in mid-2004 Iran resumed both construction of centrifuge components and conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. Again faced with a potential referral to the UNSC, the Iranians reached an agreement with the Europeans to suspend enrichment activities until Iranian Presidential elections took place and negotiations resumed in August 2005.

Days before negotiations restarted in 2005 and a package of incentives was offered to Iran in exchange for a continued suspension, Iran restarted conversion and centrifuge component manufacturing activities. Shortly thereafter, negotiations failed, which lead to a referral of Iran’s case to the UNSC in February 2006. Iran has since ended its voluntary adherence to an Additional Protocol, yet the IAEA still remains seized with the matter and Iran continues to follow its INFICIRC/153 agreement.

Gas Centrifuge Enrichment

Work on Iran's uranium centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985. This included work on undeclared centrifuge experiments based on technology acquired from Pakistan. In an IAEA November 2003 report the IAEA identified a number of failures in reporting by Iran. For example Iran’s failure to report the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002 and the importation of uranium in 1994 and its use in laser enrichment experiments.

After the February 2006 IAEA Board Meeting, Iran stopped its voluntary implementation of an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Iran will no longer have to account for research and development work. Any near-future work on centrifuge component manufacturing will not be reported to the IAEA.

Iran’s gas centrifuge program:

In 1987 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) purchased equipment offered to it by A. Q. Khan, including a set of designs and sample components for the P-1 centrifuge.

Iran has failed to clarify dates of shipments or provide documentation on this deal. The IAEA questioned if casting equipment was also purchased.

Tehran only showed the IAEA a one page, unsigned, handwritten document and claims it to be the only document that exists on the deal.

In 1994 and 1995 the AEOI acquired 500 used sets of P-1 centrifuge components and drawings from the A. Q. Khan network.

Discrepancies remain: Iran stated that the AEOI began meeting with Iran in October 1994, but documentation Iran gave the IAEA shows that shipping of centrifuges did not start until January of 2004.

Iran reports to the IAEA that it moved centrifuge research from the Plasma Physics Lab to the Kalaye Electric Company, without declaration to the IAEA.

October 2003 Iran tells IAEA that it began UF6 testing with a single centrifuge in 1999 and tests on 19 connected centrifuges in 2002.

Iran claims intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2 centrifuge components and that no P-2 components were delivered.

Iran still claims no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges between 1995 and 2002 and no discussion on centrifuge design or supply of P-2 centrifuge components took place.

Iran confirmed that between 2002 and 2003 R & D work on a modified P-2 design was carried out by a contracting company and that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design.

The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of Iran’s efforts to acquire such magnets.

Iran used its Pilot Enrichment facility, the Kalaye Electric Company to manufacture centrifuge components and conducted centrifuge tests with UF6 (Iran claimed any higher enriched particles ranging from 36% to 70% found by the IAEA in 2003 were from imported centrifuge components)

-Note: Iran said that these centrifuges were imported from Pakistan via Dubai, but the IAEA did not find any trace of enriched particles in the Dubai storage facility where they were kept.

Iran has manufactured and assembled more than 1,200 centrifuge machines to complete the additional five 164-machine cascades originally planned for their pilot centrifuge plant, according to a net assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

                                                                                                                                   

Natanz is the location of a pilot and future commercial uranium centrifuge enrichment plant located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. The existence of the facility was disclosed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran in August 2002, and first visited by the IAEA in February 2003. The Natanz site contains buildings both above and below ground and covers approximately100, 000 square meters.

-Pilot Plant

The pilot plant is comprised of six buildings that upon completion, will house approximately 1,000 P-1 centrifuges. Between March and May 2003, the IAEA took environmental samples before nuclear material was officially introduced at the facility. These samples revealed particles of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Iran attributed the sample results to the contamination of imported centrifuge components. In June 2003, Iran officially introduced uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into a single centrifuge for testing purposes. On August 19, Iran began testing a small, ten-machine cascade. When completed, the pilot plant could produce between 10-12 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually.

In a 2003 IAEA report it was noted that “no UF6 gas was being fed into the first centrifuges of the 164-centrifuge machine cascade.”

-Large-scale Commercial Plant

The commercial plant is scheduled to start accepting centrifuges in 2005 and is comprised of three massive underground structures. The two largest buildings will house cascade halls and are expected to contain approximately 50,000 centrifuge machines. At full capacity, this facility could produce approximately 400-500 kilograms of weapon-grade material annually, or enough for 15-20 nuclear weapons a year. In June 2004, Iran formally informed the IAEA that it would begin resumption of centrifuge testing and centrifuge equipment-manufacture at Natanz. This reported activity falls within Iran safeguard obligations, even though it negates a suspension agreement that EU ministers secured, and fails to reassure a skeptical international community.

Kalaye Electric Company

This is a site of enrichment activities in Tehran. In February 2003, Iranian authorities acknowledged that centrifuge components had been produced and that machines had been assembled at one of the company's facilities. Iran denied however, that Kalaye was used for any sort of actual enrichment work. The IAEA requested access to the company's workshop, which was granted in May, but the agency was not permitted to take environmental samples until early August. Results from samples tested positive for traces of both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and lowly enrich uranium (LEU).

In October 2003, Iran conceded that a limited number of centrifuge tests using uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been conducted there between 1998 and 2002. These experiments reportedly involved 1.9 kg of UF6. Iran claims that it has not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges. It attributes the presence of HEU to contaminated centrifuge components that were imported. In response to IAEA requests, Iran has provided the agency with a list of imported components and the agency has taken new samples to verify these claims.

In November 2003, the IAEA pointed out Iran’s failures to report the testing of centrifuges at this facility. The November IAEA report identified the failure of Iran to report on the “use of imported natural UF6 for testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and depleted Uranium.”

In July 2004, agency inspectors recovered about 650 g of uranium from the dismantled equipment from the Kalaye Electric Workshop.

Isfahan Conversion Facility

This facility is capable of converting uranium yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium dioxide (UO2), and uranium metal. UF6 from this plant will presumably be shipped to Natanz for enrichment. According to press reports, this facility became operational in late February. The June 18th resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of governors called on Iran to freeze the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.

Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC))

This previously undeclared facility is known to have converted uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) into uranium metal. This is also the site where previously undeclared nuclear material from China - uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and uranium dioxide (UO2)-is stored and where the IAEA in 2003 claimed that Iran did not provide information on the waste facility.

On January 20, 2004, in response to an inquiry by the IAEA, Iran acknowledged that it had received advanced, P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1994. Authorities claim that no centrifuges or components were obtained from abroad, and that all P-2 components in Iran's possession, were produced domestically. Iran also conceded that in 1999 or 2000, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed a contract with a private company in Tehran to develop P-2 centrifuges. In 2003, all P-2 centrifuge equipment was moved to the Pars Trash Company, a subsidiary of the Kalaye Company, in Tehran. Iranian claims that information about the P-2 program had not been included in previous declarations due to 'time constraints.'

In late May 2004, IAEA visited the workshop where Iran states the composite rotor cylinders for the modified P-2 designs had been manufactured. In August, Iran provided the IAEA with more details on the manufacturing and mechanical testing of the modified P-2 composite rotors from 2002 to 2003. The Agency verified that the rotor cylinders were manufactured at the workshop and also had a detailed discussion with the owner of the private company that had received a contract from the AEOI to investigate the P-2 design. However, Iran contends that there was no related activity on the P-2 centrifuges between 1995, when they receive the design and 2002 when the owner of the private company was shown the designs. The IAEA is not satisfied with this explanation.

Reprocessing Experiments

In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had irradiated depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) targets at the Tehran Research Reactor. According to Iran, experiments took place there between 1988-1992 and involved pressed UO2 pellets prepared at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. These experiments used depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. They involved 7 kilograms of UO2, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium.

Laser Enrichment

Iran has been developing a laser enrichment program for 12 years. The program is based on two techniques: atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation (MLIS). Iran admitted to the IAEA that this program produced small amounts of LEU.

The IAEA has completed its review of the AVLIS program and has concluded that the levels of enrichment achieved matched Iran’s description of the activity. The IAEA did, however, determine that the equipment could have been used for HEU production and that Iran failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

In its 2003 report the IAEA identified Iran’s failure to report, “the import of natural   uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium.”

Lashkar Ab’ad

This is a pilot plant for laser enrichment that was established in 2000. Laser enrichment experiments were conducted at Lashkar Ab'ad between October 2002 - January 2003 using 22 kilograms of natural uranium metal to produce small amounts (milligrams) of reactor grade enriched uranium (3-4 % U235). This uranium metal was part of a 50 kilograms shipment that was undeclared and is suspected to have come from the Soviet Union in 1993. Iranian authorities claim that all equipment at Lashkar Ab'ad was dismantled May 2003, and transferred to a storage facility at Karaj. On October 6, 2003, the IAEA drew environmental samples from the Lashkar Ab'ad plant. The results of the agency’s analysis indicate enrichment levels consistent with those declared by Iran. Iran provided the agency with additional documents with regards to its laser program in August 2004.

The IAEA reported in 2003 Iran’s failure to provide design information for this laser laboratory and locations where resulting wastes were processed and stored.

Karaj

This is a previously undeclared storage facility related to the laser enrichment program. Karaj contains dismantled equipment from Lashkar Ab'ad, laser enrichment waste, and approximately 28 kilograms of natural uranium metal.

The IAEA reported in 2003 that Iran failed to provide location and design information concerning the waste storage facility at Karaj.

PLUTONIUM PROGRAM

Iran's plutonium program is less advanced than its uranium program but there are four known facilities currently planned or under construction that when complete, would allow Iran to manufacture material for use in nuclear weapons.

Arak Heavy Water Facility

In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran disclosed the existence of a heavy water production facility under construction at Arak. This site was visited by the IAEA in February 2003. Iran initially told the IAEA that it planned to produce heavy water for export but in May said that the heavy water would be used as a coolant and moderator for a planned research reactor at Arak.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor

In May 2003, Iran announced plans to build a 40 MW thermal heavy water reactor at Arak. Construction on this reactor is scheduled to begin in 2004. This reactor will use uranium dioxide (UO2) and heavy water and will be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Iran claims this reactor is for R&D purposes and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. Drawings for the facility, however, contained no references to hot cells. When the IAEA confronted Iran about this, Iran stated that it has tentative plans to construct another building at Arak with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. According to non-governmental estimates, the planned Arak reactor could produce between 8-10 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for one or two nuclear weapons a year. On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.

Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing Plant

In 2004, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to begin construction of a fuel fabrication plant at Esfahan. This plant will supply fuel for the Arak reactor and possibly also for the reactor at Bushehr.

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)

From 1981 to 1993 Iran has carried out bench scale preparation of UO2 at ENTC.

Bushehr Reactor

This is a light water reactor complex located southwest of Esfahan. In 1995, Iran signed a $800 million deal with Moscow to finish construction on one of the reactors, originally begun by Germany. This 1,000 MW re actor is scheduled for completion in 2005, and Russia plans to provide the reactor fuel. On 22 August 2004 the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization said Bushehr would become operational in October 2006, a year behind schedule. On October 14, 2004 Russia announced that it had finished construction of the plant and all that remained was finalizing the contract for the return of the spent fuel back to Russia.

Reprocessing Experiments

In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had conducted plutonium reprocessing experiments in three shielded boxes in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. The experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide (UO2) that was irradiated, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium. On November 8, 2003, the separated plutonium produced in these experiments was presented to the IAEA. Iran claims that it produced 200 micrograms of plutonium in these experiments. The IAEA estimates that more plutonium should have been produced in 3 kg of depleted uranium targets. The IAEA is investigating the discrepancy. The small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of Jabr Ibn Hayan. The shielded boxes were reportedly dismantled in 1992.

In September 2003, the IAEA discovered that bismuth metal samples had been irradiated between 1989-1993. The irradiation produces polonium-210 (Po-210), which can be used with beryllium as a neutron initiator in some nuclear weapon designs. In a letter to the IAEA on November 13, 2003, Iran stated that the bismuth irradiation had been part of a feasibility study for the production and use of Po-210 in radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), or nuclear batteries. During visits to Iran in November and December 2003, the IAEA interviewed two Iranian scientists involved in the bismuth experiments. While the scientists confirmed the purpose of the project, Iran has stated that there are few records remaining related to the experiments and as a result, Iran has not been able to provide evidence supporting its claims. The agency is still assessing the information provided by Iran.

POSSIBLE NUCLEAR SITES

Razed site at Lavisan-Shian

In the summer of 2004, this site raised suspicions of a clandestine weapons program, particularly since the site was razed after November 2003, and Iran provided IAEA with access to the site only after much delay. This site first came to public attention in May 2003 when the Iranian opposition group, National Council for Resistance of Iran, announced that the site, called the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center, was associated with biological weapons research. Iran vehemently denies this accusation, saying that a Physics Research Center was established there in 1989 to prepare to combat and neutralize casualties resulting from nuclear attacks or accidents and to provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defense.

Iran maintains that “no nuclear material declarable in accordance with the Agency’s safeguards was present,” and that no nuclear fuel-cycle activities were carried out at the site. Iran has provided a list of eleven activities, which took place there. Citing “security concerns” however, Tehran has not given a list of the equipment used at the Center.

According to Iranian documents, the site was razed in response to a decision to return the site to the Municipality of Tehran from the Ministry of Defense. In September 2004, Reuters reported that the analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan shows no sign of nuclear activity.

The Parchin Military Complex

The Institute for Science and International Security, Issue Brief, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, June 17, 2004.

The Parchin military complex located about 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran is dedicated to the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The site is owned by Iran's military industry and has hundreds of buildings and test sites. Within this larger complex, there is an isolated, separately secured site, which may be involved in developing nuclear weapons. According to the Agence France- Presse (AFP), the IAEA has known about this site for some time and it has independently assessed its potential for nuclear weapons work. As a result of its analysis, the IAEA recently asked Iran about visiting this location. But Iran has so far not agreed, added the AFP report.

Based on a review of overhead imagery of this site, called location 1 in this report, this site is a logical candidate for a nuclear weapons-related site, particularly one involved in researching and developing high explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear weapon. But the evidence that this site is conducting nuclear weapons work is ambiguous.

On September 15, 2004, U.S. officials told CNN that there was no evidence supporting nuclear activity at Parchin.

Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes -- the different forms of an element having different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei -- can be used to make a nuclear weapon. Not all combinations, however, are equally convenient or efficient.

Reactor-Grade and
Weapons-Grade Plutonium
in Nuclear Explosives

==========================================================================

excerpted from the US Department of Energy Publication ~

Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessmentof Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage
and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives

(pages 37-39)

January 1997

==========================================================================

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Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes -- the different forms of an element having different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei -- can be used to make a nuclear weapon. Not all combinations, however, are equally convenient or efficient.

The most common isotope, plutonium-239, is produced when the most common isotope of uranium, uranium-238, absorbs a neutron and then quickly decays to plutonium. It is this plutonium isotope that is most useful in making nuclear weapons, and it is produced in varying quantities in virtually all operating nuclear reactors. As fuel in a reactor is exposed to longer and longer periods of neutron irradiation, higher isotopes of plutonium build up as some of the plutonium absorbs additional neutrons, creating plutonium-240, plutonium-241, and so on. Plutonium-238 also builds up from a chain of neutron absorptions and radioactive decays starting from uranium-235.
 
These other isotopes create some difficulties for design and fabrication of nuclear weapons.

• First and most important, plutonium-240 has a high rate of spontaneous fission, meaning that the plutonium in the device will continually produce many background neutrons, which have the potential to reduce weapon yield by starting the chain reaction prematurely.
• Second, the isotope plutonium-238 decays relatively rapidly, thereby significantly increasing the rate of heat generation in the material.
• Third, the isotope americium-241 (which results from the 14-year half-life decay of plutonium-241 and hence builds up in reactor-grade plutonium over time) emits highly penetrating gamma rays, increasing the radioactive exposure of any personnel handling the material.

Because of the preference for relatively pure plutonium-239 for weapons purposes, when a reactor is used specifically for creating weapons plutonium, the fuel rods are removed and the plutonium is separated from them after relatively brief irradiation (at low "burnup"). The resulting "weapons-grade" plutonium is typically about 93 percent plutonium-239.
 
Such brief irradiation is quite inefficient for power production, so in power reactors the fuel is left in the reactor much longer, resulting in a mix that includes more of the higher isotopes of plutonium. In the United States, plutonium containing between 80 and 93 percent plutonium-239 is referred to as "fuel-grade" plutonium, while plutonium with less than 80 percent plutonium-239 -- typical of plutonium in the spent fuel of light-water and CANDU reactors at normal irradiation -- is referred to as "reactor-grade" plutonium.
All of these grades of plutonium can be used to make nuclear weapons. The only isotopic mix of plutonium which cannot realistically be used for nuclear weapons is nearly pure plutonium-238, which generates so much heat that the weapon would not be stable. (International rules require equal levels of safeguards for all grades of plutonium except plutonium containing more than 80 percent plutonium-238, which need not be safeguarded.)
 
Designing and building an effective nuclear weapon using reactor-grade plutonium is less convenient than using weapon-grade plutonium, for several reasons.
 
Some nuclear weapons are typically designed so that a pulse of neutrons will start the nuclear chain reaction at the optimum moment for maximum yield; background neutrons from plutonium-240 can set off the reaction prematurely, and with reactor-grade plutonium the probability of such "pre-initiation" is large. Pre-initiation can substantially reduce the explosive yield, since the weapon may blow itself apart and thereby cut short the chain reaction that releases the energy.
 
Nevertheless, even if pre-initiation occurs at the worst possible moment (when the material first becomes compressed enough to sustain a chain reaction) the explosive yield of even a relatively simple first-generation nuclear device would be of the order of one or a few kilotons. While this yield is referred to as the "fizzle yield," a one-kiloton bomb would still have a radius of destruction roughly one-third that of the Hiroshima weapon, making it a potentially fearsome explosive. Regardless of how high the concentration of troublesome isotopes is, the yield would not be less.
 
Dealing with the second problem with reactor-grade plutonium, the heat generated by plutonium-238 and plutonium-240, requires careful management of the heat in the device. There are well developed means for addressing these problems and they are not considered a significant hurdle to the production of nuclear weapons, even for developing states or sub-national groups.
 
The radiation from americium-241 means that more shielding and greater precautions to protect personnel might be necessary when building and handling nuclear explosives made from reactor-grade plutonium. But these difficulties are not prohibitive.
 
While reactor-grade plutonium has a slightly larger critical mass than weapon-grade plutonium (meaning that somewhat more material would be needed for a bomb), this would not be a major impediment for design of either crude or sophisticated nuclear weapons.
 
The degree to which these obstacles can be overcome depends on the sophistication of the state or group attempting to produce a nuclear weapon.
 
At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that).
 
At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapons-grade plutonium.
 
The greater radioactivity would mean increased radiation doses to workers fabricating such weapons, and military personnel spending long periods of time in close proximity to them, and the greater heat and radiation generated from reactor-grade plutonium might result in a need to replace certain weapon components more frequently.
 
Proliferating states using designs of intermediate sophistication could produce weapons with assured yields substantially higher than the kiloton-range possible with a simple, first-generation nuclear device.
Every state which has built nuclear weapons from plutonium to date has chosen to produce weapons-grade plutonium for that purpose. States have been willing to make large investments in some cases to acquire weapon-grade rather than reactor-grade plutonium: the United States, for example, in the 1980s, considered spending billions of dollars on the Special Isotope Separation facility to enrich reactor-grade plutonium to weapon-grade.
 
The disadvantage of reactor-grade plutonium is not so much in the effectiveness of the nuclear weapons that can be made from it as in the increased complexity in designing, fabricating, and handling them. The possibility that either a state or a sub-national group would choose to use reactor-grade plutonium, should sufficient stocks of weapon-grade plutonium not be readily available, cannot be discounted.
In short, reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states. Theft of separated plutonium, whether weapons-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.
 
The plutonium-240 content even in weapons-grade plutonium is sufficiently large that very rapid assembly is necessary to prevent pre-initiation. Hence the simplest type of nuclear explosive, a "gun type," in which the optimum critical configuration is assembled more slowly than in an "implosion type" device, cannot be made with plutonium but only with highly enriched uranium, in which spontaneous fission is rare.
This makes HEU [Highly Enriched Uranium] an even more attractive material than plutonium for potential proliferators with limited access to sophisticated technology.
 
Either material can be used in an implosion device.





Nuclear Power Plant Fuel--a source of Plutonium for Weapons? (A Continuation of the Bogus Claims of the USA as to Iran's Nuke ambitions)

Many people may not realize that every nuclear power plant -- as a normal part of the fissioning process -- produces plutonium. Plutonium and/or highly-enriched uranium are essential ingredients of nuclear bombs.
Every year the thousand-megawatt Callaway reactor in Missouri, for example, produces an estimated 293 kilograms of plutonium 1. -- enough plutonium every year to make forty nuclear bombs (each containing about 7.3 kilograms [16 pounds] of mixed isotopes of plutonium per bomb).2
If the nuclear power reactor continues operating for a total of 30 years, it will have produced enough plutonium for at least 1200 bombs.
Every year and a half, some of the irradiated fuel rods -- all of which contain plutonium 3 -- are removed from the reactor vessel and are replaced with fresh uranium rods. The irradiated rods are then stored in a concrete spent-fuel pool or in dry-storage canisters -- on site --for an indefinite amount of time. No permanent repository exists anywhere for the irradiated rods.
"Reprocessing" technologies exist that can extract plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Although no commercial reprocessing plant is currently operating in the U.S., reprocessing is under way in Japan, England, France, Russia and India. And the Department of Energy and Japan are expending significant funds here in the U.S. on research, development, and demonstration projects for cheaper, faster, more efficient ways to reprocess irradiated fuel.
The nuclear industry and others support the reprocessing of irradiated, commercial nuclear power plant fuel and the "recycling," then, of its extracted plutonium into new nuclear plant fuel (a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides). Proponents of reprocessing are advocating the "burn-up" of plutonium as fuel in existing and/or "advanced" nuclear power reactors.
Environmentalists, on the other hand, point out that past reprocessing has been responsible for major environmental degradation in the countries that have employed it, including the United States. In order to extract plutonium, reprocessing requires that irradiated reactor fuel rods -- the most radioactive materials on earth -- be cut up, and dissolved in a solvent, resulting in the release of massive quantities of radioactive gases and other substances. Leakage of the remaining stored high-level radioactive wastes at West Valley, New York; Hanford, Washington; Idaho Falls, Idaho; and Savannah River, South Carolina, has created cleanup problems that will take hundreds of billions of dollars, with complete remediation an impossibility.
They also warn that terrorists could steal the extracted plutonium from stockpiles at reprocessing or fuel fabrication plants, or during transport between the facilities, and use it in the manufacture ofnuclear bombs. The potential for sabotage or theft at these facilities would be substantial.
Additionally, other dangers inherent in nuclear power plants would remain: the routine releases of fission products into the environment, the exposure of workers to radiation, the potential for a major accident, and the accumulation of long-lived wastes from the reactors' continuing operation. 4
Proposals pending in Congress to transport the irradiated fuel that is currently stockpiled at some seventy nuclear power plant locations out to Nevada for interim storage -- and possibly someday, for ultimate disposal or reprocessing -- would place thousands of shipments of plutonium-bearing fuel onto our railroads and highways, coast-to-coast. Federal regulations require that armed escorts be present during all shipments of irradiated fuel -- evidence that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real.
No American electric utility has placed an order for a nuclear power plant that was not subsequently canceled since October 1973 (the Palo Verde plant in Arizona). That is, no new nuclear plants are being added. However, every existing reactor, because of the presence of plutonium, is a potential target for terrorism.
Nuclear reactors and the plutonium they generate threaten the hope for world peace and survival.
We would like to acknowledge the contribution by Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, Senior Staff Scientist of the Natural Resources Defense Council, who calculated the annual plutonium production of the Callaway nuclear power plant.

NOTES:

1. 1. The above calculation of 293 kilograms of plutonium per year assumes the Callaway reactor (1150-megawatt electric; 3565-megawatt thermal) operates at 80% of its capacity. Please remember: approximately 60 percent of the plutonium will be plutonium-239, which has a half-life of 24,000 years and remains hazardous for at least ten half-lives.
2. 2. See Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 50, No. 1, Part II, Jan. 1978, page S29. With greater technical expertise, a nuclear weapon can be built with considerably less plutonium than the amount estimated here.
3. 3. Although the plutonium generated by a commercial nuclear power plant is not technically "weapons grade," it has long been acknowledged that nuclear bombs can be and have been built with reactor-grade plutonium.
4. 4. All nuclear power plants release radioactive gases, liquids, and particulates into the environment as a part of their routine operation. It does not take an accident. Such releases include tritium (radioactive hydrogen) and other radioactive gaseous material, much of which can be neither filtered nor monitored.