Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium

See Folks, they (the government and the powers that are) have never motioned anything on the possibilities of Plutonium which is a natural by-product of a controlled and sustained atomic chain reaction in a nuclear power plant:
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By Revati Prasad and Jill Marie Parillo

Updated February 2006

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URANIUM ENRICHMENT

                

Development of an Iranian enrichment program started just after the 1974 oil crisis. The program nearly came to a halt following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, yet Iran continued small scale nuclear research, including centrifuge experiments in the 1980s. Iran has pursued two different methods for enriching uranium: gas centrifuge enrichment and laser enrichment.

In October of 2003 to avoid referral to the UN Security Council (UNSC) Iran suspended its enrichment program and allowed for IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol. Iran signed the protocol on December 18, 2003, though the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) never ratified it. However, in mid-2004 Iran resumed both construction of centrifuge components and conversion activities at its Esfahan facility. Again faced with a potential referral to the UNSC, the Iranians reached an agreement with the Europeans to suspend enrichment activities until Iranian Presidential elections took place and negotiations resumed in August 2005.

Days before negotiations restarted in 2005 and a package of incentives was offered to Iran in exchange for a continued suspension, Iran restarted conversion and centrifuge component manufacturing activities. Shortly thereafter, negotiations failed, which lead to a referral of Iran’s case to the UNSC in February 2006. Iran has since ended its voluntary adherence to an Additional Protocol, yet the IAEA still remains seized with the matter and Iran continues to follow its INFICIRC/153 agreement.

Gas Centrifuge Enrichment

Work on Iran's uranium centrifuge enrichment program began in 1985. This included work on undeclared centrifuge experiments based on technology acquired from Pakistan. In an IAEA November 2003 report the IAEA identified a number of failures in reporting by Iran. For example Iran’s failure to report the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002 and the importation of uranium in 1994 and its use in laser enrichment experiments.

After the February 2006 IAEA Board Meeting, Iran stopped its voluntary implementation of an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Iran will no longer have to account for research and development work. Any near-future work on centrifuge component manufacturing will not be reported to the IAEA.

Iran’s gas centrifuge program:

In 1987 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) purchased equipment offered to it by A. Q. Khan, including a set of designs and sample components for the P-1 centrifuge.

Iran has failed to clarify dates of shipments or provide documentation on this deal. The IAEA questioned if casting equipment was also purchased.

Tehran only showed the IAEA a one page, unsigned, handwritten document and claims it to be the only document that exists on the deal.

In 1994 and 1995 the AEOI acquired 500 used sets of P-1 centrifuge components and drawings from the A. Q. Khan network.

Discrepancies remain: Iran stated that the AEOI began meeting with Iran in October 1994, but documentation Iran gave the IAEA shows that shipping of centrifuges did not start until January of 2004.

Iran reports to the IAEA that it moved centrifuge research from the Plasma Physics Lab to the Kalaye Electric Company, without declaration to the IAEA.

October 2003 Iran tells IAEA that it began UF6 testing with a single centrifuge in 1999 and tests on 19 connected centrifuges in 2002.

Iran claims intermediaries only supplied drawings for P-2 centrifuge components and that no P-2 components were delivered.

Iran still claims no work was carried out on P-2 centrifuges between 1995 and 2002 and no discussion on centrifuge design or supply of P-2 centrifuge components took place.

Iran confirmed that between 2002 and 2003 R & D work on a modified P-2 design was carried out by a contracting company and that the contractor had made enquiries about, and purchased magnets suitable for the P-2 centrifuge design.

The Agency is still awaiting clarification of all of Iran’s efforts to acquire such magnets.

Iran used its Pilot Enrichment facility, the Kalaye Electric Company to manufacture centrifuge components and conducted centrifuge tests with UF6 (Iran claimed any higher enriched particles ranging from 36% to 70% found by the IAEA in 2003 were from imported centrifuge components)

-Note: Iran said that these centrifuges were imported from Pakistan via Dubai, but the IAEA did not find any trace of enriched particles in the Dubai storage facility where they were kept.

Iran has manufactured and assembled more than 1,200 centrifuge machines to complete the additional five 164-machine cascades originally planned for their pilot centrifuge plant, according to a net assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

                                                                                                                                   

Natanz is the location of a pilot and future commercial uranium centrifuge enrichment plant located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran. The existence of the facility was disclosed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran in August 2002, and first visited by the IAEA in February 2003. The Natanz site contains buildings both above and below ground and covers approximately100, 000 square meters.

-Pilot Plant

The pilot plant is comprised of six buildings that upon completion, will house approximately 1,000 P-1 centrifuges. Between March and May 2003, the IAEA took environmental samples before nuclear material was officially introduced at the facility. These samples revealed particles of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Iran attributed the sample results to the contamination of imported centrifuge components. In June 2003, Iran officially introduced uranium hexafluoride (UF6) into a single centrifuge for testing purposes. On August 19, Iran began testing a small, ten-machine cascade. When completed, the pilot plant could produce between 10-12 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually.

In a 2003 IAEA report it was noted that “no UF6 gas was being fed into the first centrifuges of the 164-centrifuge machine cascade.”

-Large-scale Commercial Plant

The commercial plant is scheduled to start accepting centrifuges in 2005 and is comprised of three massive underground structures. The two largest buildings will house cascade halls and are expected to contain approximately 50,000 centrifuge machines. At full capacity, this facility could produce approximately 400-500 kilograms of weapon-grade material annually, or enough for 15-20 nuclear weapons a year. In June 2004, Iran formally informed the IAEA that it would begin resumption of centrifuge testing and centrifuge equipment-manufacture at Natanz. This reported activity falls within Iran safeguard obligations, even though it negates a suspension agreement that EU ministers secured, and fails to reassure a skeptical international community.

Kalaye Electric Company

This is a site of enrichment activities in Tehran. In February 2003, Iranian authorities acknowledged that centrifuge components had been produced and that machines had been assembled at one of the company's facilities. Iran denied however, that Kalaye was used for any sort of actual enrichment work. The IAEA requested access to the company's workshop, which was granted in May, but the agency was not permitted to take environmental samples until early August. Results from samples tested positive for traces of both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and lowly enrich uranium (LEU).

In October 2003, Iran conceded that a limited number of centrifuge tests using uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been conducted there between 1998 and 2002. These experiments reportedly involved 1.9 kg of UF6. Iran claims that it has not enriched uranium beyond 1.2% U-235 using centrifuges. It attributes the presence of HEU to contaminated centrifuge components that were imported. In response to IAEA requests, Iran has provided the agency with a list of imported components and the agency has taken new samples to verify these claims.

In November 2003, the IAEA pointed out Iran’s failures to report the testing of centrifuges at this facility. The November IAEA report identified the failure of Iran to report on the “use of imported natural UF6 for testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 and 2002, and the consequent production of enriched and depleted Uranium.”

In July 2004, agency inspectors recovered about 650 g of uranium from the dismantled equipment from the Kalaye Electric Workshop.

Isfahan Conversion Facility

This facility is capable of converting uranium yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium dioxide (UO2), and uranium metal. UF6 from this plant will presumably be shipped to Natanz for enrichment. According to press reports, this facility became operational in late February. The June 18th resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of governors called on Iran to freeze the conversion of uranium in Esfahan.

Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC))

This previously undeclared facility is known to have converted uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) into uranium metal. This is also the site where previously undeclared nuclear material from China - uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and uranium dioxide (UO2)-is stored and where the IAEA in 2003 claimed that Iran did not provide information on the waste facility.

On January 20, 2004, in response to an inquiry by the IAEA, Iran acknowledged that it had received advanced, P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1994. Authorities claim that no centrifuges or components were obtained from abroad, and that all P-2 components in Iran's possession, were produced domestically. Iran also conceded that in 1999 or 2000, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed a contract with a private company in Tehran to develop P-2 centrifuges. In 2003, all P-2 centrifuge equipment was moved to the Pars Trash Company, a subsidiary of the Kalaye Company, in Tehran. Iranian claims that information about the P-2 program had not been included in previous declarations due to 'time constraints.'

In late May 2004, IAEA visited the workshop where Iran states the composite rotor cylinders for the modified P-2 designs had been manufactured. In August, Iran provided the IAEA with more details on the manufacturing and mechanical testing of the modified P-2 composite rotors from 2002 to 2003. The Agency verified that the rotor cylinders were manufactured at the workshop and also had a detailed discussion with the owner of the private company that had received a contract from the AEOI to investigate the P-2 design. However, Iran contends that there was no related activity on the P-2 centrifuges between 1995, when they receive the design and 2002 when the owner of the private company was shown the designs. The IAEA is not satisfied with this explanation.

Reprocessing Experiments

In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had irradiated depleted uranium dioxide (UO2) targets at the Tehran Research Reactor. According to Iran, experiments took place there between 1988-1992 and involved pressed UO2 pellets prepared at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. These experiments used depleted uranium that had been exempted from safeguards in 1978. They involved 7 kilograms of UO2, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium.

Laser Enrichment

Iran has been developing a laser enrichment program for 12 years. The program is based on two techniques: atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and molecular isotope separation (MLIS). Iran admitted to the IAEA that this program produced small amounts of LEU.

The IAEA has completed its review of the AVLIS program and has concluded that the levels of enrichment achieved matched Iran’s description of the activity. The IAEA did, however, determine that the equipment could have been used for HEU production and that Iran failed to report a large number of conversion, fabrication and irradiation activities involving nuclear material, including the separation of a small amount of plutonium.

In its 2003 report the IAEA identified Iran’s failure to report, “the import of natural   uranium metal in 1994 and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiments, including the production of enriched uranium.”

Lashkar Ab’ad

This is a pilot plant for laser enrichment that was established in 2000. Laser enrichment experiments were conducted at Lashkar Ab'ad between October 2002 - January 2003 using 22 kilograms of natural uranium metal to produce small amounts (milligrams) of reactor grade enriched uranium (3-4 % U235). This uranium metal was part of a 50 kilograms shipment that was undeclared and is suspected to have come from the Soviet Union in 1993. Iranian authorities claim that all equipment at Lashkar Ab'ad was dismantled May 2003, and transferred to a storage facility at Karaj. On October 6, 2003, the IAEA drew environmental samples from the Lashkar Ab'ad plant. The results of the agency’s analysis indicate enrichment levels consistent with those declared by Iran. Iran provided the agency with additional documents with regards to its laser program in August 2004.

The IAEA reported in 2003 Iran’s failure to provide design information for this laser laboratory and locations where resulting wastes were processed and stored.

Karaj

This is a previously undeclared storage facility related to the laser enrichment program. Karaj contains dismantled equipment from Lashkar Ab'ad, laser enrichment waste, and approximately 28 kilograms of natural uranium metal.

The IAEA reported in 2003 that Iran failed to provide location and design information concerning the waste storage facility at Karaj.

PLUTONIUM PROGRAM

Iran's plutonium program is less advanced than its uranium program but there are four known facilities currently planned or under construction that when complete, would allow Iran to manufacture material for use in nuclear weapons.

Arak Heavy Water Facility

In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran disclosed the existence of a heavy water production facility under construction at Arak. This site was visited by the IAEA in February 2003. Iran initially told the IAEA that it planned to produce heavy water for export but in May said that the heavy water would be used as a coolant and moderator for a planned research reactor at Arak.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor

In May 2003, Iran announced plans to build a 40 MW thermal heavy water reactor at Arak. Construction on this reactor is scheduled to begin in 2004. This reactor will use uranium dioxide (UO2) and heavy water and will be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Iran claims this reactor is for R&D purposes and the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. Drawings for the facility, however, contained no references to hot cells. When the IAEA confronted Iran about this, Iran stated that it has tentative plans to construct another building at Arak with hot cells for the production of radioisotopes. According to non-governmental estimates, the planned Arak reactor could produce between 8-10 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for one or two nuclear weapons a year. On 18 June 2004 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution submitted by France, Germany and Britain, that called on Iran to freeze the construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak.

Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing Plant

In 2004, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to begin construction of a fuel fabrication plant at Esfahan. This plant will supply fuel for the Arak reactor and possibly also for the reactor at Bushehr.

Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)

From 1981 to 1993 Iran has carried out bench scale preparation of UO2 at ENTC.

Bushehr Reactor

This is a light water reactor complex located southwest of Esfahan. In 1995, Iran signed a $800 million deal with Moscow to finish construction on one of the reactors, originally begun by Germany. This 1,000 MW re actor is scheduled for completion in 2005, and Russia plans to provide the reactor fuel. On 22 August 2004 the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization said Bushehr would become operational in October 2006, a year behind schedule. On October 14, 2004 Russia announced that it had finished construction of the plant and all that remained was finalizing the contract for the return of the spent fuel back to Russia.

Reprocessing Experiments

In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that it had conducted plutonium reprocessing experiments in three shielded boxes in a hot cell at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. The experiments took place between 1988 and 1992, and involved 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide (UO2) that was irradiated, 3 kilograms of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium. On November 8, 2003, the separated plutonium produced in these experiments was presented to the IAEA. Iran claims that it produced 200 micrograms of plutonium in these experiments. The IAEA estimates that more plutonium should have been produced in 3 kg of depleted uranium targets. The IAEA is investigating the discrepancy. The small amount of separated plutonium was stored in a laboratory of Jabr Ibn Hayan. The shielded boxes were reportedly dismantled in 1992.

In September 2003, the IAEA discovered that bismuth metal samples had been irradiated between 1989-1993. The irradiation produces polonium-210 (Po-210), which can be used with beryllium as a neutron initiator in some nuclear weapon designs. In a letter to the IAEA on November 13, 2003, Iran stated that the bismuth irradiation had been part of a feasibility study for the production and use of Po-210 in radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), or nuclear batteries. During visits to Iran in November and December 2003, the IAEA interviewed two Iranian scientists involved in the bismuth experiments. While the scientists confirmed the purpose of the project, Iran has stated that there are few records remaining related to the experiments and as a result, Iran has not been able to provide evidence supporting its claims. The agency is still assessing the information provided by Iran.

POSSIBLE NUCLEAR SITES

Razed site at Lavisan-Shian

In the summer of 2004, this site raised suspicions of a clandestine weapons program, particularly since the site was razed after November 2003, and Iran provided IAEA with access to the site only after much delay. This site first came to public attention in May 2003 when the Iranian opposition group, National Council for Resistance of Iran, announced that the site, called the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center, was associated with biological weapons research. Iran vehemently denies this accusation, saying that a Physics Research Center was established there in 1989 to prepare to combat and neutralize casualties resulting from nuclear attacks or accidents and to provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defense.

Iran maintains that “no nuclear material declarable in accordance with the Agency’s safeguards was present,” and that no nuclear fuel-cycle activities were carried out at the site. Iran has provided a list of eleven activities, which took place there. Citing “security concerns” however, Tehran has not given a list of the equipment used at the Center.

According to Iranian documents, the site was razed in response to a decision to return the site to the Municipality of Tehran from the Ministry of Defense. In September 2004, Reuters reported that the analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan shows no sign of nuclear activity.

The Parchin Military Complex

The Institute for Science and International Security, Issue Brief, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, June 17, 2004.

The Parchin military complex located about 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran is dedicated to the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The site is owned by Iran's military industry and has hundreds of buildings and test sites. Within this larger complex, there is an isolated, separately secured site, which may be involved in developing nuclear weapons. According to the Agence France- Presse (AFP), the IAEA has known about this site for some time and it has independently assessed its potential for nuclear weapons work. As a result of its analysis, the IAEA recently asked Iran about visiting this location. But Iran has so far not agreed, added the AFP report.

Based on a review of overhead imagery of this site, called location 1 in this report, this site is a logical candidate for a nuclear weapons-related site, particularly one involved in researching and developing high explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear weapon. But the evidence that this site is conducting nuclear weapons work is ambiguous.

On September 15, 2004, U.S. officials told CNN that there was no evidence supporting nuclear activity at Parchin.